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Introduction
The emergence of new technologies to address previously unsolvable health issues is no longer
merely an anticipated possibility, but has become an almost a foregone conclusion. Hand-in-hand
with fast-paced innovation arise queries regarding the force of intellectual property (“IP”)
protection to be granted to new technologies. IP protection, despite its title, is not a uniform class
of right, but rather a group of distinct rights. IP protection is commonly touted as necessary to
promote creativity and to provide creators with a reason to aspire to producing more efficacious
innovations. Although this belief has recently come under criticism, it still represents the
foundation of most IP regimes.1
In the environment of pro-technological advancement it behooves us to recognize that
appropriate protection for new technologies must be well-contemplated and tailored to fit each
class of invention. Just as one would not wear socks outside in the rain instead of boots to protect
one’s feet from the wet, the mere fact that an IP regime exists and is available does not
necessarily make it the best means of protecting a particular technology. By their very novelty,
some new technologies challenge the limits of existing IP regimes and fail to fit comfortably
within the boundaries of established innovation categories. In fact, complex technologies may
actually fit, at least partially, within many protective regimes and categories. Therefore, the
question must be asked: which form of IP protection should a creator choose? And more
importantly, who should a creator turn to for guidance when selecting a protection strategy from
many available options? Surely setting up a unique IP regime for each new category of
technology would be an administrative nightmare and is therefore not a feasible solution.
However, ignoring the situation is not an appropriate response either.
An example of a new category of technology which may confound existing IP regimes is plant
derived vaccines (“PDVs”). The make-up of this innovation is just as its name suggests – a
vaccination product derived from plants. Although there is no trick to understanding the nature
of PDVs, deciding which IP regime may be utilized to protect this invention can prove to be
troublesome. Due to the fact that the technology ties together several elements which have
previously stood alone as distinct technological categories, PDVs fit simultaneously within
several existing categories, each of which offers unique aspects of protection. In basic terms, a
PDV is a plant variety, a drug, a biotechnological innovation and a developing nation-focused
product all-in-one. It is therefore difficult to categorize PDVs for the purpose of IP protection.
This paper will examine the new category of invention represented by PDVs as an example of
the difficulties that new technologies can pose to the attainment of adequate IP protection. Part I
of the paper will describe the PDV category of technology and set-out the IP rights which
                                                 
1 Robert T. Hughes and John H. Woodley, Hughes and Woodley on Patents,  looseleaf, Markham,
Buttersworth, 1984, para. §1.This principal is often referred to as the bargain theory, which supports the grant of an
intellectual property right to a creator in exchange for disclosure of the creation. In this manner the public benefits
from disclosure, while the exclusive right granted to the creator provides an incentive to undertake further creation.
The Supreme Court of Canada has also articulated in several judgements that a balance of IP rights must be achieved
between the private and public. See, Theberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336; CCH
Canada Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] SCC 13; Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd., [2002] 4
S.C.R. 1; Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45.
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inventors have applied thus far. Part II of the paper will discuss the existing categories of
protection which PDVs may be fit within. Both the nature of each category and the fit, or ill-fit,
of PDVs within the category, will be examined. Part III of the paper will generally discuss the
difficulties that are posed by the normal course of establishing an IP protection strategy for new
categories of technology, such as PDVs. Part IV will propose a proactive means of remedying
the confusion created by new categories of technology. Namely, that an expert panel be
convened to evaluate new categories of technology at the point when a creator working in the
field first seeks protection. The panel would offer guidance as to the best mode of protection for
the category of technology as a whole, that could be relied upon by future innovators working in
the same category of technology. This solution would overcome the confusion created by PDVs
and other new technologies and ensure the new categories of innovation attain comprehensive
and tailored IP protection.
Part I – PDVs
PDVs are not available on the public market as of yet, but some are entering the final phases of
research and development (“R&D”) and will be ready for human consumption shortly. This
means it is a perfect time to be contemplating the scope of IP protection for this new category of
invention. A key factor in ensuring proper protection is achieved is understanding the nature of
PDVs.
The science of PDVs is a relatively new approach to the creation of vaccination products, based
upon transgenic plants developed from the recombination of DNA through the isolation of genes.
The genes which are utilized must have enzymes that can be cut and pasted into DNA strands.
Once modified the genes may be utilized to cultivate a transgenic plant or seed. After a PDV is
grown, the transgenic plant materials may be ingested by a human or animal to trigger an
immunogenic response. One of the benefits of PDVs is that transgenic plants can regenerate and
therefore significant amounts of recombinant DNA may be produced. The result is that a large
supply of this form of vaccine may be cultivated at a low cost.
In basic terms, PDVs represent the cultivation of genetically-modified plant material – such as a
leaf, fruit or vegetable – which has a genetic make-up that causes it to act a vaccination upon
ingestion. An example of a PDV is a genetically-modified potato plant engineered to invoke an
immune response to hepatitis B surface antigens when the potato is fed to a human or animal.2
The purpose of all innovations within the PDV category of technology is to propagate a
vaccination from plant materials. The resulting products have many benefits. Most notably,
PDVs offer the chance to literally eat our medicine.
In fact, PDVs were originally dubbed “edible vaccines”. This name was given because early
research focused upon administration through ingestion of raw plant materials, such as a tomato,
to attain the immunization effect. Since that time research has shown that consistent doses cannot
be assured in raw plant materials, and thus scientists now focus upon using dried PDV plant
materials to create a product that may be administered orally, such as a pill, capsule or powder.
The use of capsules is particularly beneficial because the coating applied can be engineered to
dissolve in a particular area of the stomach. This means that the vaccination can be released in a
specific area of the body. By directing the medicine the efficiency of PDVs is increased.
                                                 
2 Canadian Patent Application No. 2,321,260, filed October 12, 2000.
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PDVs have several other benefits which cause them to be of particular interest for application in
developing countries – low price, easy transportation, long-term storage potential, no cold-chain
logistics, non-technical administration, and public health protection.3 Traditional vaccine
products must be kept cold, require specialized training to administer, and are derived from
microbial fermentation sources and insect and mammalian cell cultures sources which are
expensive to reproduce. Together these attributes raise the price of each vaccine dosage and limit
the potential range of distribution. PDVs overcome the hurdles facing traditional vaccines and
represent a low-price product that is easy to replicate, transport and administer.
Wide scale vaccination is an important step in preventing the contraction of certain diseases and
eventually eradicating diseases in targeted areas. Several diseases that are presently rampant in
developing countries raise not only health issues within a community, but also have economic,
administrative and social effects. Three such diseases are Hepatitis B, Rabies and Cholera.
Hepatitis B4 — Hepatitis B virus is a DNA virus that causes hepatitis B infection in humans,
which can lead to short-term acute disease, or long-term chronic disease. Patients who contract
an acute infection are at risk of dying within weeks or days of the onset of symptoms. Those with
a chronic form of hepatitis B may escape immediate fatality, but will carry the disease for years
and may develop liver cirrhosis or primary liver cancer as a result. The hepatitis B virus is
carried in the blood and blood-derived bodily fluids of infected persons and can be transferred
through contact with a carrier’s blood caused by unsafe injections or transfusions, sexual contact,
tattooing and scarification. In India the number of hepatitis B carriers is estimated to be over 40
million. Studies have established that childhood hepatitis B immunization in India is a cost-
effective means of combating the disease.
Rabies5 —  Rabies symptoms are initially non-specific involving the respiratory, gastrointestinal
and central nervous systems. However, at the acute stage the signs are clearer – hyperactivity and
paralysis are followed by coma and ultimately death due to respiratory failure. Without treatment
a patient will generally die within a week. The most common mode of infection is through
contact with infected animals. It is estimated that 98% of human rabies occurs in areas with large
numbers of both stray and domestic dogs. Presently rabies is incurable, and therefore pre-
exposure vaccination is recommended for all persons with a high risk of exposure to the rabies
virus. However, vaccination is problematic for persons of low incomes because available rabies
vaccines are expensive – costing approximately $30 to $100 USD per dosage.
Cholera6 — Cholera is a disease transferred by the ingestion of contaminated food or water
which triggers an acute intestinal infection. The infection causes dehydration which eventually
may lead to death. In areas where clean water is available the risk of cholera infection is very
low, however, natural disasters, such as the 2004 tsunami which affected southeast Asia, create a
                                                 
3 Royal Society of London, et al., Transgenic Plants and World Agriculture, London, National Academy
Press, 2000, p. 12, <http://books.nap.edu/html/transgenic/>.
4 This section has been entirely developed with data extracted from WHO, Prevention of Hepatitis B in
India, South-East Asia, Regional Office, 2002 and Introduction of Hepatitis B vaccine in the Universal
Immunization Program, India, Child Health Division, 2002.
5 This section has been entirely developed with data extracted from WHO, 2003 and JK Dutta, “Human
Rabies in India: Epidemiological Features, Management and Current Methods of Prevention”, Tropical Doctor,
n°29, 1999, pgs. 196-201.
6 This section has been entirely developed with data extracted from the WHO cholera information website
found at <http://www.who.int/topics/cholera/en/>.
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risk of cholera epidemic. In 2003 WHO data recorded 2,893 cases of cholera and 2 deaths. These
numbers are estimated to represent 5-10% of the actual cases worldwide. Moreover, the number
of cases and deaths is expected to increase significantly for 2005 due to the tsunami.
In sum, the benefits that available and affordable vaccination products offer to developing
nations are significant.7 However, as the affordability and availability of products can be directly
affected by IP rights, merely creating a PDV does not ensure efficacy. No matter what the nature
of a technology is, if IP rights are wielded so as to jealously protect a particular market sector,
the result will likely be an increase in the price of the innovation, which in turn creates an access
hurdle. Thus, appropriate IP protection is just as important as rigorous scientific R&D if PDVs
are to live up to their potential.
A. How are PDVs presently protected?
Presently the most common source of IP protection sought for PDVs is a patent. PDVs may also
be protected as trade secrets. Trade secret protection is not grounded in statute, but is rooted in
business practices which protect confidentiality of information relating to an innovation.8 Trade
secret protection relies upon confidentiality rather than registration and is understood to be an
alternative to patent protection.9 Reliance upon confidentiality renders trade secret a fragile IP
right, because the protection can be immediately and irretrievably lost upon disclosure.
Nowadays, due to innovations which promote quick and wide-spread distribution of information,
such as the internet, trade secret protection can literally be lost at the push of a button. The
upside of trade secret protection is the competitive advantage that it can provide because, unlike
patents, no public disclosure is required. In an environment where adequate confidentiality
measures are in place and enforceable, trade secrets provide an effective means of concealing
information from the public and thereby securing a market sector monopoly.10
Although trade secrets can be effective, the fragility of the right causes many parties to opt to
seek patent protection for an invention instead. Surety of protection is integral to researchers,
including those working with PDVs, due to the need to raise investor capital to fund research
initially and later commercialization of an invention.11 Commercialization assistance is of
particular concern to PDV researchers as they will likely need to seek partnerships with groups
able to undertake large vaccination efforts, such as the World Health Organization (the “WHO”),
in order to sell their invention.12
                                                 
7 Supra note 3 at 13.
8 Trade secrets are referenced in some Canadian legislation, notably the Quebec Civil Code and Trade-Marks
Act, but there is no single statute devoted solely to trade secrets.
9 As a right of enforcement, the owner of a trade secret is permitted to take action against any party who
breaches confidentiality. Three elements must be proven in order to establish a breach of confidentiality: 1) the
information had the necessary quality of confidence about it; 2) the information had been disclosed in circumstances
imparting an obligation of confidence; and 3) unauthorized use of the information constituted a detriment to the
party who first communicated it. Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 74 at
638.
10 This benefit may be lost if a technology may be easily reversed-engineered.
11 Richard T. Mahoney, et al., “The introduction of new vaccines into developing countries II. Vaccine
financing”, Vaccine, n°18, 2000, p. 2625.
12 Richard T. Mahoney and James E. Maynard, “The introduction of new vaccines into developing countries”,
Vaccine, n°17, 1999, 646 at 649.
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Patents rights are granted nationally for a term of twenty years after the examination of a filed
patent application, which must prove the disclosed invention to be novel, useful and non-
obvious.13 The invention can represent a product, method or process. Once granted a patent
holder has the exclusive right to make, construct, use and sell their invention.14 This is broad
protection which allows the patent holder to have essentially full control over the use of their
invention by the public. Tools of control include an assignment of patent right, license
agreements and other contractual arrangements between a patent holder and the public. As such,
the owner of a PDV patent has the option to make the technology freely-available to others who
could benefit from it, or to reserve access solely for those who offer substantial amounts of
compensation in exchange for the use of the invention. This choice will have serious
implications for PDVs once they reach the marketplace.
1. PDV patents and patent applications
Existing PDV patents and applications exemplify that this form of technology can be formulated
in many ways to combat a variety of diseases. Presently, the majority of PDV patent applications
have been filed with the patent offices of the United States, Canada and Europe.15 Some of these
applications are filed under the Patent Co-operation Treaty.16 The majority of the inventors listed
are residents of the United States, and ownership of the filed patents is claimed by both private
companies and governmental bodies.17
The filed patents and applications teach a variety of aspects of PDVs and include process,
method and product claims. The following exemplifies claimed methods and processes: a
method for genetic alteration of a plant; a method for isolating a protein expressed in plant
material; and a method of oral administration of a plant derived vaccine. Whereas product claims
include: an edible transgenic plant; a plant cell; a plant seed; an immunogenic composition; and a
transgenic plant comprised of cells that elicit an immune response when consumed as food stuff.
Immunization against a variety of diseases is disclosed – hepatitis B, hepatitis A, human
papillomavirus, are some of the viruses claimed.
A variety of genetic-engineering techniques to produce transgenic plants capable of expressing
immunogenic polypeptides in quantities sufficient to elicit an immune response are disclosed in
the filed patents and applications. One method is to scar a plant, such as a tobacco leaf, potato or
                                                 
13 Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, as amended S.C. 1993, c. 15, ss. 2, 28.3 & 44.
14 Ibid. at s. 42.
15 This is noteworthy, as the patent laws in each of these countries differ. In particular the issues of patenting
of genes and higher life forms are not uniform (e.g. plants are not patentable in Canada, but are in the United States).
The outcome is that patent applications filed by the same inventor for the same PDV invention in each office will
not be identical.
16 Patent Co-operation Treaty applications allow the applicant to reserve the right to file national patent
applications in multiple countries at a future date.
17 See, Richard T. Mahoney et al., “The introduction of new vaccines into developing countries III. The role
of intellectual property”, Vaccine, n°22, 2004, p. 786. It is noteworthy that presently PDV applications are filed
primarily in developed nations. These patents are filed to protect not only the final product, but also aspects of the
research process (“research tools”), which is likely undertaken in developed nations. However, as a main benefit of
the technology is its application in the developing world, the act of seeking patent protection solely in developed
nations means that PDVs will not be provided protection where they may ultimately be most widely applied. This
choice may be affected by the anticipated profits from PDVs which will have application in both developed and
developing nations, but may be sold at a higher price in developed nations. Thus, any copying of PDVs in developed
nations will be costly for the patent holders and patents rights will help them combat such abuses.
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a tomato fruit, and to introduce a plasmid vector, comprising a DNA sequence encoding a
specific capsid protein operably linked to a plant-specific promoter and gene encoding selection
marker expression vectors, into the scar tissue. The seeds from the resulting plant or fruit may be
harvested and utilized to regenerate a whole transgenic plant having fruit or leaves that contain a
vaccine element. Alternatively, the plasmid vector can be introduced into sterile seeds which are
caused to grow, thereby producing a whole transgenic plant. The seeds from the transgenic plant
will then be harvested to grow other transgenic plants. The means of administering PDVs include
mixing plant materials with an adjuvant, ingestion of pure plant materials, spraying a dose, a
patch and intravenous injection.
The foregoing describes only some of the filed PDV patents and applications. The range of the
inventions claimed exemplifies the breadth of the category of technology represented by PDVs.
Many methods, processes and products are claimed incorporating a variety of plants and
targeting a range of diseases. As scientific discovery in this area has really only just begun,
PDVs have the potential to represent a very important category of technology from IP, economic
and health viewpoints.
2. PDVs & risks
Due to their unique make-up, PDVs raise some significant issues. Foremost amongst these is the
fact that PDVs may pose serious risks to the public if they are not handled with the utmost care.18
For example, environmental issues and biodiversity concerns are raised by any transgenic seeds
or plants that escape into the wild. Moreover, as PDV plant materials cannot be distinguished
from non-PDV versions of the same plant – e.g. a PDV tomato looks like a traditional tomato –
there is a risk of misadministration, which in its most heinous form could represent an act of bio-
terrorism. The processing of plant materials raises further issues. A main concern is the biomass
which is created during the PDV processing and manufacturing stages.19 These leftovers contain
genetically-modified genes and must be destroyed in a responsible manner so as to ensure that no
biomass is left unaccounted for. To combat these risks PDV plants are produced and grown in a
regulated environment to avoid biosafety hazards. These and other risk-aversion measures ensure
that some level of control is influenced over PDVs to protect society. These risks should be
acknowledged in the shaping of an IP protection strategy for PDVs.
Part II – IP protection options & issues for the multiple attributes of
PDVs
Despite the fact that patent protection has become the standard form of PDV IP protection, this is
not the only form of right available. Generally IP protection strategies are applied to accord with
established categories of technology – biotechnology, computer software, sound recordings, etc.
Each category applies aspects of existing IP regimes – patents, copyright, trade secrets, etc. The
result is that two categories of invention protected by the same base IP regime, such as patents,
may seek protection in distinct ways that reflect the specific attributes of the class of innovation.
As PDVs do not fit neatly into any presently recognized category of innovation, several
protection options may be pursued. If a PDV was the object of a game of twenty-questions it
                                                 
18 Supra note 3 at 20.
19 Supra note 3 at 6. One proposed solution to the problem of the accumulation of transgenic plant biomass is
to use it to create a sustainable fuel source.
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might start off like this: is it a plant, a drug, a biotechnology? And the answer would be yes
across the board. PDVs fit within all three categories at once. The collection of so many
attributes in one innovation makes it difficult to categorize a PDV in traditional terms, and this in
turn means it is hard to authoritatively determine how best to protect a PDV.
This section will examine the characteristics of PDVs and the various established categories of
IP protection they may fit within due to the fact that a PDV is a plant, a drug, a biotechnology
and a developing nation product all-in-one. Each category will be reviewed, as will the IP issues
it raises that are relevant specifically to PDVs. The context of the discussion will be Canadian
law, but as similar protections are available in many countries, including the United States and
European nations, the analysis will have a broad relevance.
A. A plant
A primary characteristic of a PDV is that, in all of its manifestations, the innovation is either in
the form of a plant, or includes plant materials, having an unique genetic make-up. It is this
constitution that causes the PDV to act as a vaccine when ingested. The distinct make-up of a
PDV may also mean it falls within the category of a plant variety.
In general terms, PDV plant varieties may be genetically-engineered so as to include at least one
of two unique characteristics. First, a PDV may be generated to target a specific disease and
provide a immunogenic response effective against that illness, such as hepatitis B virus, cholera,
rabies, etc. Second, a PDV may be created using a particular type of plant – a tomato plant,
potato plant, tobacco plant, etc. As such,  two PDVs may both be created from banana plants, but
each may be genetically-modified differently, so that one constitutes a PDV effective against
hepatitis B and the other is effective against malaria. Another two PDVs may be represented by
different plants, a potato plant and a tomato plant, but both may be effective against cholera. Any
PDV combination of targeted disease and plant may represent a distinct plant variety and
therefore be eligible for plant variety protection.
1. Canadian plant variety protection
Plant variety protection is established in several countries, including Canada. The Canadian
Plant Breeders’ Rights Act20 (the “PBRA”) protects species of sexually and asexually reproduced
plant varieties. To garner protection a plant variety must be new, which means it must be
“distinguishable from other varieties, stable in its essential characteristics and sufficiently
homogenous.”21 A plant breeders’ right-holder is granted the following exclusive rights over a
plant variety in Canada: to sell and produce propagating material; to use the propagating material
to develop a new plant variety; and to permit others to do these acts.22 These rights extend for a
term of eighteen years.
The PBRA was created in response to the Pioneer Hi-Bred Ltd. v. Canada (Commissioner for
Patents)23 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada (the “SCC”) which found that plants were
                                                 
20 R.S.C. 1990, c. 20.
21 Eileen Morin, “Of Mice and Men: The Ethics of Patenting Animals”, Health L.J., n°5, 1997, p.147, at 192.
Supra note 20 at s. 4.
22 Supra note 20 at ss. 5.1 & 6.
23 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1623.
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unlikely to meet the criteria for patentability in Canada. The issue before the court in Pioneer
was whether a plant which had been cultivated by means of artificial cross-breeding of three
plant varieties was an invention in accordance with the Patent Act. The Patent Appeal Board
who initially heard the case determined that cross-breeding as a technique involves a lesser
degree of human intervention than does genetic manipulation and, therefore, the cross-bred plant
at bar did not qualify as an invention. Ultimately the SCC unanimously dismissed the appeal on
the basis of inadequate disclosure, holding that “the statutory requirement of an adequate
description of an invention cannot be met solely by the deposit of a sample of the plant variety.”24
Thus, the SCC avoided answering the question whether plants may ever represent patentable
subject matter. However, the court did make an interesting distinction when it commented upon
the methods of breeding plants. Specifically the SCC stated that there are two types of genetic
engineering: i) cross-breeding, which involves natural growth techniques manipulated through
human intervention; and ii) recombinant DNA technology, which involves human directed
alteration of the genetic code of plants. Cross-breeding was at issue in Pioneer and the SCC held
that this technique does not alter the plant “reproductive process, which occurs in accordance
with the laws of nature.”25 Thus, cross-breeding appears to be too close to the natural
reproductive process to be patentable.26
Due to the fact that the SCC focused upon cross-breeding and failed to offer further comment on
recombinant DNA technology, the door was left open for DNA genetic-engineering to be
deemed patentable. However, since Pioneer the SCC has revisited the issue of the patentability
of higher life forms, a category which encompasses plants, in Harvard College v. Canada
(Commissioner of Patents).27 The outcome is that higher life forms are not patentable in Canada.
Thus, Harvard shut the door.
In comparison to the Patent Act, the PBRA offers a form of protection that is limited. This makes
sense as a plant breeders’ right is intended to be granted to plant technologies which fall short of
patentability criteria. In particular, the PBRA does not require utility. However, the act does set
out a number of strict guidelines. Of primary concern are the requirements that a plant breeder
disclose his or her plant variety and that propagating material be maintained.28 In fact, the scope
of a plant breeders’ right is limited to the propagating material specifically, which includes the
cuttings, seeds or other parts of the plant. No right over the plant as a whole is granted.
Not only is the scope of the right limited but its application is also curbed. For example, the
PBRA does not prohibit another breeder from using protected varieties to develop new plant
varieties or stop a farmer from retaining the seeds from a protected variety crop to grow new
plants the next season.29 A further diminution of the scope of a plant breeder’s right may be
                                                 
24 Morin, supra note 21 at 164.
25 Supra note 23 at para. 18.
26 It is a tenet of patent law that mere discoveries are not patentable. This issue has recently been reiterated by
Canadian courts in Calgon Carbon Corporation v. City of North Bay, [2005] F.C. 838.
27 Harvard, supra note 1.
28 Supra note 20 at ss. 9 & 30. Details regarding disclosure are provided in the Plant Breeders’ Rights
Regulations, 1991, SOR/91-594 at s. 19(1)(g).
29 The practice of saving seeds is commonly referred to as a farmer’s privilege. Contractual arrangements are
applied by some companies to overcome this privilege. For example, Monsanto Canada Inc. requires farmers who
purchase their genetically-modified canola seeds to sign a technology user agreement, which prohibits retention of
seeds from one year to the next.
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undertaken by the commissioner, who can grant a compulsory license to any person over any
protected plant variety for the purpose of ensuring the availability of the plant variety at a
reasonable price, establishing a wide distribution of a plant variety, maintaining the quality of a
plant variety, and providing the rights-holder with reasonable remuneration.30 Each of these
sanctioned uses of plant varieties exemplify limitations upon a plant breeder’s right and are
exempt from constituting the foundation of any charge of infringement of the right against an
offending member of the public.
2. International plant variety protection
National plant breeders’ rights are supported at the international level by the Union for the
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (“UPOV”) which established the UPOV System of
Protection of Plant Varieties in 1961 in Paris, with the adoption of the International Convention
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (the “UPOV Act”). Subsequent amendments to the
UPOV Act, in 1978 and 1991, have furthered its goal to encourage the development of new plant
varieties and ultimately benefit society through the grant of a sui generis IP right to plant
breeders. The criteria for protection under the UPOV Act are novelty, distinctness, uniformity
and stability.31
The UPOV Act sets out that plant breeders are to be granted exclusive rights pertaining to
production, reproduction, conditioning for the purpose of propagation, offering for sale, selling,
or marketing, importing, exporting and stocking. The rights granted to breeders have become the
focus of attention following recent amendments to the UPOV Act. A change to the act extended
rights to include an “essentially derived variety” of plant. This modification raises questions
regarding the scope of the granted right. Further controversy has surrounded provisions that
cause a farmer’s right to save seeds and reuse them for their own benefit to be subject to a
payment of royalties to the breeder.32 This modification is offensive to some because it is
possible that the requirement that royalty payments be made to a breeder upon the reuse of seeds
could present a significant hurdle for farmers in developing countries and augment food
insecurity issues.33 A further notable provision introduced at the time of the 1991 amendment to
the UPOV Act states that ordre public considerations can supersede infringement, as long as
equitable remuneration is offered. The effect of ordre public may be to override the need to seek
the consent of the rights-holder prior to utilizing a protected plant variety. All of these changes to
the UPOV Act have raised the voices of critics who are concerned about the perceived injustice
                                                 
30 Supra note 20 at s. 32.
31 Michael Halewood, “Indigenous and Local Knowledge in International law: A Preface to Sui Generis
Intellectual Property Protection”, McGill L.J., n°44, 1999, p. 953 at 962. The requirement of novelty was added as
of the 1991 UPOV amendments.
32 See, “Undermining farmers’ rights to their seed”, National Farmers Union, 2004,
<http://nfu.ca/seedsavercampaign/NFU_Seeds_Fact_Sheet_2.pdf>, and Hope Shand, “Legal and technological
measures to prevent farmers from saving seed and breeding their own plant varieties”, In  J. Janick (ed.),
Perspectives on new crops and new uses, Alexandria, ASHS Press, 1999. p. 124–126.
33 See, Vandana Shiva, “The Indian seed act and patent act: sowing the seeds of dictatorship”, ZNet, 14
February 2005, <http://www.zmag.org/content/print_article.cfm?itemID=7249&sectionID=56>.
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of UPOV. In particular, the opponents argue that UPOV offers insufficient solutions to the
problems facing developing countries.34
Canada has been a member of UPOV since March 4, 1991.35 Members are required to grant and
protect breeders’ rights pursuant to article 2 of the UPOV Act. Article 4 permits individual
nations to grant breeders’ rights within their borders as long as such rights are extended in
accordance with the UPOV Act and “without prejudice”. This means that the Canadian PBRA
must conform to the principles of the UPOV Act.
3. PDVs and plant variety protection
Although neither the UPOV Act nor the PBRA offer perfect protection for plant varieties, it is
clear that PDVs may seek this type of sui generis right. PDVs are plant varieties created through
recombinant DNA technology and are distinguishable from other plant varieties. This was
acknowledged as a form of genetic-engineering by the SCC in Pioneer and thus may be deemed
to have been within the consideration of the drafters of the PBRA. Thus, if the breeder of a PDV
so wishes, he or she may submit an application for plant breeders’ rights protection. However, it
should be reiterated that this type of right is limited and that it extends solely to the propagating
materials and not to the plant itself. Thus, it is not the PDV plant which is ultimately protected,
but the plant variety and the materials from which plants having the same genetic make-up may
be grown. However, this right is not entirely without influence. It can be wielded by the holder to
prohibit others from making use of a variety of plant without the consent of the breeder. For
PDVs, this offers a level of control over the growth of transgenic plants which is crucial in light
of the risks associated therewith.
B. A drug
The purpose of the creation of PDVs is to produce a new form of vaccination product. Vaccines
are described by the WHO as “relatively complex biological products.”36 It is the biological
nature of vaccines that distinguishes them from other types of medical treatments, such as
medicines comprised of chemical compounds.37 Vaccines are included in the category of
biologics by the United States Food and Drug Administration and are given the following
definition: “Biologics, in contrast to drugs that are chemically synthesized, are derived from
living sources (such as humans, animals, and microorganisms). Most biologics are complex
mixtures that are not easily identified or characterized, and many biologics are manufactured
using biotechnology. Biological products often represent the cutting-edge of biomedical research
and, in time, may offer the most effective means to treat a variety of medical illnesses and
conditions that presently have no other treatments available.”38
                                                 
34 Jan Wendt and Juan Izquierdo, “Biotechnology and Development: A balance between IPR and protection
and benefit-sharing” Electronic Journal  of Biotechnology, 2001, at 3, <http://www.agbios.com/docroot/articles/01-
361-002.pdf >.
35 UPOV, Members List, <http://www.upov.int/en/about/members/pdf/pub423.pdf >.
36 Christopher Garrison, “Background paper for WHO workshop: Intellectual Property Rights and Vaccines
in Developing countries” WHO, 2004, at 9.
37 For the purpose of this paper chemical compound drugs will be referenced as distinct from the category of
“vaccine”, which specifically includes biological elements.
38 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Centre for Biologics Evaluation and Research, “About Us”,
<http://www.fda.gov/cber/about.htm>.
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The WHO recently published a report on the topic of vaccines and IP protection.39 A background
paper released prior to the report outlined the three main methods of protecting vaccines that are
presently applied. These include: i) patent rights over the vaccine product, the process of creating
the vaccine, as well as inventions related to upstream research (known as research tools);40 ii)
trade secrets to protect know-how necessary to produce the vaccine; and iii) undisclosed data
derived from tests or other aspects of the R&D process which are held confidentially.41 This
section will focus upon patents.
Although patent protection and trade secret protection may seem straight-forward it is crucial
that we look at these forms of protection in the context of drugs specifically. Patents in particular
may initially appear to represent a means of protection that is common to many of the
characteristics of PDVs. Particularly that a PDV is a drug and biotechnology. This may, at first
glance, be considered a positive fact that would suggest that patent rights may easily protect
many aspects of a PDV simultaneously. However, it should be noted that protection for drugs,
and PDVs specifically, involves some unique conditions to which patents for other categories of
inventions, and therefore other aspects of PDVs, are not subjected. These issues unique to the
drug element of PDVs include co-operative legislation, international recognition of the role of
ordre public in public health, compulsory licensing and food issues. Each will be discussed
individually.
1. Co-operative legislation
In order to address the unique issues surrounding drugs, both the food and drugs and patent
regimes in Canada have been attuned one to another so that they may function harmoniously.
This synchronization has been undertaken to assuage concerns that patented drugs raise
regarding public health. Indeed ethical and emotional issues surrounding health issues have been
cited as the reason why medical treatments in and of themselves are not patentable.42 David
Vaver points out that members of the medical profession are expected to “share their skills and
should not foreclose others from applying them.”43 Patents are seen as hindering an environment
of sharing. To help curb fears and calm emotions, which are indivisible from health issues,
previously separate legislative efforts are now linked through co-operative legislation - namely,
                                                 
39 WHO, “Intellectual Property Rights and Vaccines in Developing Countries” WHO/IVB/04.21, 2004.
40 The WHO report, Ibid. at 12. Dr. Martin Friede presented to the WHO and in the objective of his
discussion was to “highlight the fact that many components and technologies go into making a vaccine, and each of
these may be subject to intellectual property.” Some of the components will be tools that are necessary to produce
the vaccine product, such as “a variety of technologies [that] are required to express and purify the antigen, and to
formulate it so that it is immunogenic, induces a protective immune response, is stable and can be appropriately
delivered. [Intellectual property] on cross-cutting technologies such as expression systems, fusion partners,
immunostimulators, adjuvant systems, excipients and delivery devices may be required,  and access to each
[Intellectual property] component may limit the feasibility of making a vaccine” (at 12). See also, Supra note 3 at
31.
41 Supra note 36 at 2.
42 The Patent Act, supra note 13, does not expressly prohibit the patenting of medical treatments. However,
the SCC’s decision in Tennessee Eastman Co. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents) (1970), 62 C.P.R. 117 (Ex.Ct.),
held that medical treatments are not patentable, although a compound utilized in a treatment may be patentable. The
effect of this decision is affirmed by section 12.04.02 of the Manual of Patent Office Practice, looseleaf, Hull,
CIPO, 1998, (“MOPOP”) which says that medical treatments are not considered to be within the scope of
“invention”, as defined in section 2 of the Act.
43 David Vaver, Intellectual Property Law, Concord, Irwin Law, 1997, at 130.
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the Patent Act, the Food and Drugs Act (the “F&D Act”)44 and the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations (the “NOC Regulations”).45
Due to the fact that many different terms are applied to drug products – pharmaceuticals,
medicines, biologics – it is important to review each of the co-operative statutes to ensure that a
vaccine invention is included within their purview. Section 79(2) of the Patent Act states that, an
invention pertains to medicine if it is used either as a medicine or to prepare or produce a
medicine.46 The term “medicine” is defined in section 2 of the NOC Regulations as a substance
which can be used for “mitigation or prevention of a disease”. Whereas, the F&D Act, applies
the term drugs, which it defines to include substances used in the “prevention of a disease”.47
Each of these definitions encompass vaccines applied to prevent diseases in humans. Therefore
the co-operative legislative scheme may be assumed to be applicable to vaccine products and
PDVs in particular.
Under the Patent Act exclusive patent rights may be granted over new drugs. In order to be
patentable a drug must be claimed in relation to a specific practical application, or disease. The
result is that drug patents correspond not to mere formulations, but to formulations having a
designated utility.48 Once a drug patent is granted a further step must be taken prior to
introducing the drug to the marketplace. It must be approved in accordance with the F&D Act.
To aid in this process, and as part of the integration of the patent regime and the food and drugs
regime, the minister will issue a notice of compliance (“NOC”) once the drug is ascertained to be
safe and effective. Prior to the issuance of a NOC a drug may not be advertised or sold in
Canada. In order to obtain a NOC, a new drug submission must be supported by a detailed
compilation of information, data and research, including information about any patent issued for
the drug.
Co-operation between the food and drugs regime and the patent regime ensures that the term of a
patented drug is respected. In particular generic drug manufacturers are prohibited from
attempting to introduce an equivalent drug into the marketplace during the patent term.49 The
effect of the co-operative effort is that, “the NOC Regulations introduce patent considerations
                                                 
44 R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27.
45 This co-operative effort was initiated as of 1993 with the introduction of the NOC Regulations. Another
example of co-operation between the Patent Act and the F&D Act is fostered by the Jean Chrétien Pledge Pledge to
Africa Act, given royal assent May 14, 2004, which amends both statutes to waive certain TRIPs provisions
considered to pose barriers to effective responses to health emergencies.
46 Sections 80 to 103 of the Patent Act relate to patented medicines specifically.
47 Supra note 44 at article 2.
48 Teresa Scassa, “Patents for Second Medical Indications and their Potential Impact on Pharmacare in
Canada”, Health L.J. 23, n°9, 2001 at 30. Scassa discusses the fact that the requirement that a patented medicine be
claimed in conjunction with a specific disease leads to the creation of second medical indications patents. Relying
upon the SCC’s decision in Shell Oil Co. v. Commissioner of Patents, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 536, which held that a patent
can be issued for a new use of a known compound, second medical indication patents are granted for uses for a
medicine which are discovered following the original patent disclosing the medicinal compound. For example,
Pfizer Canada has two patents for the drug sertraline hyrdrocholoride (Zoloft), the first being issued for the drug to
treat depression and the second for use for other approved indications (Scassa, at 23).
49 The introduction of a generic drug into the marketplace prior to the expiration of an existing patent for the
same compound is known as spring-boarding and may be the basis for an action against the offending generic drug
manufacturer. Aventis Pharma Inc. v. Novopharm Limited, [2005] F.C. 815.
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into the regulatory approval process.”50 The link between the patent regime and the food and
drug regime will affect IP protection choices for PDVs.
2. Ordre public
A further consideration specific to patented vaccines is the effect of the World Trade
Orgainzation (“WTO”) Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs”)
agreement. Canada is a TRIPs member state, as are many other nations worldwide. TRIPs sets
out specific provisions which members are required to comply with when asserting IP protection
within their national borders. TRIPs provisions are flexible to a point, however, any failure on
the part of a member to comply with TRIPs poses a risk that the offending state will be brought
before the WTO dispute settlement body. Such an outcome can be detrimental to a country’s
sovereignty in the area of IP enforcement and therefore all member states are wise to remain
mindful of their TRIPs obligations.
TRIPs imposes duties upon members, but it also offers some relief from forms of stringent IP
protection. One such relief is offered in article 27.2 which recognizes that exclusions to
patentability or commercial exploitation may be upheld for the purpose of protecting ordre
public or morality. This provision is interpreted as expressly extending to the protection of
health. Thus, in reliance upon article 27.2, a country may deem certain subject matter non-
patentable for the purpose of protecting health. Such subject matter could include vaccines or
other drugs (although it seems unlikely that this would ever occur). Moreover, the wording
“necessary to protect ordre public or morality” has been judicially considered in the context of a
WTO decision and the indication is that future interpretation may in fact limit the scope of article
27.2. Still, upon its face this provision opens the door for significant amendments to the
definition of patentable subject matter, as long as modifications are made in the name of
protecting health.
Section 8 of TRIPs addresses “measures necessary to protect public health” directly. In the
opinion of Bita Amani, this should be interpreted to mean that “the protection of [IP rights]
should not impede domestic discretion to adopt necessary measures to protect public health and
promote public interest in sectors of vital importance to socio-economic and technological
development by creating a monopoly on knowledge or a monopoly on health.”51 Thus, at the very
least, articles 8 and 27.2 place all patents related to health care in greater jeopardy of being
subjected to an exemption founded upon ordre public or morality than other types of patented
inventions. If these exemptions are invoked a patent holder’s rights may be diminished if not
annihilated. This risk weakens the force of the presumption of the validity for drug patents.
3. Compulsory licensing
Recent debate regarding the accessibility and affordability of pharmaceutical52 products in
developing nations has brought the relation between compulsory licensing and drugs to the
                                                 
50 Scassa, supra note 48 at 46.
51 Bita Amani, “Patents & Public Health: International Trade Obligations and Domestic Policy
Development”, Health L. Canada, n°22, 2002, p. 76 at 89.
52 In common discourse the general category of pharmaceutical has been divided so that bio-pharmaceuticals
are distinguished from non-biologic pharmaceuticals, such as chemical compound pharmaceuticals. Bio-
pharmaceutical is a relatively recent term, which should be understood as having a specific marketplace application.
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forefront. The WHO has commented that “much of the debate on [IP rights] and public health
has focused on the possible impact that patents on final products have on the prices paid in
developing countries and, hence, their affordability. In the case of vaccines, the nature of their
development and production and the nature of the final market may require a different kind of
debate.”53 The report goes on to cite distinctions between pharmaceuticals and vaccines, noting
the following: that vaccines have much smaller markets; that the public sector has a greater
involvement in the production, pricing and marketing of vaccines; that vaccines as biological
products are more complex and costly to produce; that clinical trials may also be much more
costly for vaccines; and that it may be much more difficult to copy a vaccine.54 Although these
distinctions make it clear that discussion about the impact of patents upon the accessibility and
affordability of vaccines may not be identical to that regarding pharmaceuticals, it is still true
that both types of drugs fulfill a significant role in public health. It has been stated that “despite
the 1.5% share that vaccines have in global pharmaceutical turnover in dollars, vaccines
represent much more than 1.5% of the capacity to deal with global health problems, because
they have positive externalities.”55
Due to the important role of vaccines in the maintenance of public health it is imperative that
governments take all possible steps to ensure that vaccines are widely available at affordable
costs. One such measure at hand is compulsory licensing. This option may be implemented in the
name of public health. Both the Canadian Patent Act and TRIPs provide for the remedy of
compulsory licensing to be applied in the instances of either “national emergency or extreme
urgency”, wherein the invention will be applied to a “public non-commercial use”.56
Both clauses have been considered in the context of public health emergencies. In Canada the
Commission on the Future of Health Care noted in their 2002 report that the sustainability of
health care policies relies upon “ensuring that sufficient resources are available over the long
term to provide timely access to quality services that address Canadians’ evolving health
needs.”57 A failure to provide such access may in some circumstances constitute a national
emergency. Some authors have noted that it is imperative that other legal options such as
licenses, negotiated use and statutory authorization be pursued before resorting to compulsory
licensing.58 However, recent debate about the provision of HIV AIDs drugs to Africa has
highlighted the fact that compulsory licensing threatens the rights of holders of drug patents,
including patented vaccines.59 The risk that compulsory licenses will be applied to drug patents is
greater than for other types of patents, due to the important role that drugs play in the context of
                                                                                                                                                              
The term pharmaceutical has been further distinguished from vaccines by the WHO, supra note 39. For the purpose
of this section of this paper pharmaceuticals shall be defined narrowly to include solely chemical compounds and
therefore as distinct from biologics.
53 Supra note 39 at 4.
54 Ibid. at 4-5.
55 Ibid. at 6.
56 See, section 19.1(2) of the Patent Act, supra note 13, and article 31 of TRIPs.
57 Roy J. Romanow, Building on Values: The Future of Health Care in Canada--Final Report, Saskatoon,
Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, 2002 at 1, <http://www.healthcarecommission.ca >.  See also,
Timothy Caulfield, “A Colloquy on the Romanow Report: Sustainability and the Balancing of the Health Care and
Innovation Agendas: The Commercialization of Genetic Research”, Sask. L. Rev., n°66, 2003, p. 629.
58 Supra note 51 at 95.
59 Amy Kapczynski, et al., “Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for
University Innovations”, Berkley Tech. L.J., n°20, 2005, p, 1031 at 1057-1069.
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the maintenance of public health. A patent for a PDV which discloses the invention as a vaccine
product will be no exception.
4. A food
Now that we have looked at the role of PDVs as drugs specifically, we need to review the
options as to the form by which PDVs may be administered. It is the means of oral
administration which may raise some confusion regarding the breadth of the nature of PDVs. As
has been discussed, PDVs can be administered in the form of an unprocessed, fresh plant
material or fruit. Despite problems with administration of PDVs as edible vaccines, specifically
relating to dosage issues, this form of invention has not been abandoned in R&D initiatives
altogether. Consequently, PDVs may constitute food.
Foods receive special treatment within the F&D Act. Food is defined broadly in the act as “any
article manufactured, sold or represented for use as food or drink for human beings, chewing
gum, and any ingredient that may be mixed with food for any purpose whatever.”60 All foods
introduced to the marketplace must conform with a set of regulations under the act that are
separate from those applied to drugs. There is the potential for a PDV which is administered by
way of consumption of raw plant materials to fall within both the categories of drug and food.
5. PDVs and drug patents
In sum, as a vaccination a PDV is protectable by patent. However, patent rights granted for
PDVs may be targets for statutory exceptions such ordre public and compulsory licenses, due to
the invention’s role in public health. The potential for PDVs to be true edible vaccines causes
more uncertainty for rights over PDVs as the scope of food and drug regulation which must be
applied to PDVs is unclear. Depending on the final embodiment of the invention, a PDV product
may be simultaneously both a drug and a food. All of these issues evoke special considerations
for PDVs which must be weighed if an effective strategy of IP protection is to be applied to this
category of invention.
C. A biotechnology
The nature of PDVs means that they fit into yet another category of invention, namely
biotechnology. Biotechnology has been defined as “the application of scientific and engineering
principles to the processing of materials by biological agents to provide goods and services.”61
This is a broad definition which appreciates that biotechnology can be applied in a variety of
sectors, including health, agriculture, environment and industry.62 Looking at the health sector
specifically, biotechnology is hailed as a possible solution to a wide array of health issues
                                                 
60 Supra note 44 at s. 2. The Canadian definition is narrower than other definitions due to the fact that it
references the intended use of the food, this can be contrasted with the European Food Authority’s (the “EFA”)
definition which holds that food “means any substance or product intended to be, or expected to be ingested by
humans”, see Dominique Lauterburg, Food Law: Policy & Ethics, London, Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2001, at
46. According to the EFA definition PDVs would definitely qualify as foods, whereas in Canada an argument could
be raised that PDVs are not necessarily sold or represented for use as food per se.
61 Halla Thorsteinsdóttir, et al., “Introduction: promoting global health through biotechnology”, Nature
Biotechnology, n°22, 2004, DC3 at DC6.
62 Ibid. at DC6.
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occurring worldwide.63 Plant-made pharmaceuticals have been identified by the United States
Biotechnology Industry Organization (“BIO”) as one of the health applications of biotechnology,
“whereby plants are genetically modified to produce new drugs and biologics that can prevent or
treat diseases and save lives.”64 As PDVs are created through the genetic-modification of plants,
they fit squarely within the category of biotechnology. There are two aspects of biotechnology
patent rights which are of particular interest to PDVs and will be discussed in this section –
patent construction to determine the scope of the patent rights and biological material deposit
rules.
1. Patent construction
Biotechnology products can benefit from both trade secret and patent protection. Each of these
forms of IP are haunted by considerations beyond the bounds of pure science, which arise in
conjunction with the clinical trials and commericialization stages in particular. These include
ethical, social and cultural concerns. In the words of E. Richard Gold and Wendy A. Adams, “the
health benefits to individual recipients of the products of biotechnological innovation are self-
evident, although far from uncontroversial.”65 Others have voiced concerns as to whether
extending strong IP rights to biotechnological innovation is ethical, or even legally defensible.66
Specific issues raised by PDVs include liabilities related to the growth of transgenic plants and
the production of drugs from these materials. BIO has acknowledged that steps must be taken to
minimize the risks associated with the production of plant based genetically modified health
technologies, including control of exposure to transgenic plants and their expression products.67
BIO’s caution is the type of issue that will likely be addressed through regulation or policy
initiatives to restrict the growth of plants to confined facilities and to ensure that processing,
milling and extraction of transgenic plant materials is undertaken separate from commercial food
and feed channels.68 These represent physical protections which may be achieved. Recent case
law has examined the legal protections available, through a review of the validity and scope of
claims which form the basis of patent rights held in biotechnology inventions.
In 2002, the SCC was asked to determine the patentability of a genetically-engineered mammal.
Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents)69 involved a patent application claiming a
mouse that, due to genetic modification, was more susceptible to cancerous tumours. Ultimately
the SCC held that the drafters of the Patent Act had not intended higher life forms to fit within
                                                 
63 Ibid. at DC3. See also, E. Richard Gold and Wendy A. Adams, “Reconciling Private Benefit and Public
Risk in Biotechnology: Xenotransplantation as a Case Study in Consent”, Health L.J., n°10, 2002, p. 31 at 32. Gold
and Adams highlight some of the health applications of “modern technology” including the creation of medications
which are matched to the genetic make-up of the patient to “reduce adverse reactions and maximize positive ones
(pharmacogenics).”
64 Biology Industry Organization, “Reference Document for Confinement and Development of Plant-Made
P h a r m a c e u t i c a l s  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ” ,  1 7  M a y  2 0 0 2 ,
<http://www.bio.org/healthcare/pmp/PMPConfinementPaper.pdf>. BIO distinguishes between plant-made
pharmaceuticals and an edible vaccine form of PDVs in “Plant-Made Pharmaceuticals: Frequently Asked
Questions”, <http://www.bio.org/healthcare/pharamaceutical/pmp/factsheet2.asp?p=yes&>.
65 Gold and Adams, supra note 63 at 32.
66 Lorraine Sheremeta and Bartha Maria Knoppers, “Beyond the Rhetoric: Population Genetics and Benefit-
Sharing”, Health L.J., n°11, 2003, p. 89 at 92-93.
67 Supra note 64 at 6.
68 Ibid. at 4.
69 [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45.
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the definition of patentable subject matter. Thus, despite the fact that the same invention has
been accepted as patentable subject matter in a number of other influential nations, including the
United States, Japan and European countries, the SCC held that the onco-mouse, as well as all
other forms of higher life, are not patentable in Canada. This represents a significant decision
exemplifying that patent rights over biotechnological innovations are by no means certain.
In its 2004 Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser70 decision, the SCC revisited the issue of patent
rights over biotechnological innovations. At issue was a patent granted for an agricultural
biotechnology product, Round-up Ready canola. This time round, the SCC did two remarkable
things. First, the majority decision stated outright that the claims did not need to be construed for
the purpose of determining the scope of the patent rights at issue. Four years earlier purposive
construction had been introduced by the same court in two concurrent decisions, each of which
stressed the importance of undertaking a comprehensive construction of patent claims before
establishing the scope of granted patent rights.71 As such, the decision of the SCC to refrain from
construing Monsanto’s claims was startling. Following this first surprising act, the SCC went on
to render a judgement which in effect ignored its stance in Harvard, but fell short of overruling
the prior decision altogether.
The Harvard judgement draws a line between higher and lower life forms. According to the
judgement, plants clearly fall into the category of higher life forms. Thus, a decision that
complies with Harvard would find that patent rights cannot be extended to plants. In the course
of Monsanto the SCC articulated a doctrine that extends patent scope beyond the written claims
if a non-claimed element is determined to have an “important role in production”.72 In
application this doctrine means that patent scope can be understood to cover both the claimed
invention as well as any broader structure that encapsulates or incorporates the invention.73 A
plain language interpretation of this doctrine is that, although it was the genes of the agricultural
biotechnology that were claimed in the patent at issue in Monsanto, the entire plant is granted
patent protection due to the fact that the plant encapsulates the claimed genes.74 The result of the
Monsanto decision therefore is that the court extended patent rights to the plant, in defiance of its
prior judgement in Harvard.75
Harvard and Monsanto have been described as “the most significant decisions in the area of
biotech patent law anywhere in the world.”76 The esteem denoted to the decisions makes their
inconsistencies that much more disconcerting. The expansive doctrine applied in Monsanto is a
dangerous precedent as it broadens patent scope beyond the actual patent claims. As a result,
“the chance for error becomes more acute” and the uncertainty about patent scope for
biotechnology is consequently heightened.77 It is important to note that the SCC rendered the
                                                 
70 [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902.
71 Free World Trust v. Électro Santé, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1024 and Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco Inc., [2000] 2
S.C.R. 1067. See also, E. Richard Gold and Karen Lynne Durell, “Innovating the Skilled Reader: Tailoring Patent
Law to New Technologies”, I.P.J., n°19, 2005, p. 189.
72 Supra note 70 at para. 42.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid. at para. 43.
75 Gold and Durell, supra note 71 at fn. 138.
76 A. David Morrow and Colin B. Ingram, “Of Transgenic Mice and Round-up Ready Canola: The Decisions
of the Supreme Court of Canada in Harvard College v. Canada and Monsanto v. Schmeiser”, U.B.C. L. Rev., n°38,
2005, p. 189 at 189.
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Monsanto judgement in a manner that conflicts with Harvard, but does not overrule Harvard.
Thus, the accepted law in Canada is that higher life forms are not patentable.78 When read
together the only clear message that can be taken from the recent SCC judgements is that the
scope of patent rights over biotechnology is unclear at best. The boundaries for patent scope over
technologies such as transgenic plant PDVs is especially blurry. Thus, it is virtually impossible
to authoritatively state which aspects of PDVs will be held to lie within the fence-posts of patent
scope. Precedent jurisprudence is of limited assistance as Monsanto and Harvard offer different
answers to the same question.
2. Biological material deposit
The depth of disclosure that is required for PDVs may require more than a written submission. In
some instances merely describing a biotechnological invention in words in the patent application
will not be sufficient to meet the standard of disclosure required by section 27(3) of the Patent
Act.79 Where words fail to fully describe a biotechnology invention it may necessary for the
applicant to provide biological material as part of the patent disclosure.80 This being said, a
deposit of biological material will never replace a written description, but may be required as a
supplement thereto.81 Section 38.1 of the Patent Act addresses the deposit of biological material
stating that it subsequently becomes part of the specification of the filed patent application.
At the international level biological material deposits are supported by the Budapest Treaty on
the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purpose of Patent
Procedure, as established in 1977 and adopted in Canada on September 21, 1996.82 The
Budapest Treaty authorizes depositaries to collect and store materials. Each recognized
depositary is known as an International Depositary Authority (“IDA”) and only deposits made
with recognized IDAs will be considered to comply with the requirements of the Canadian
Patent Act and Patent Rules. According to Canadian patent legislation certain steps must be
complied with for a biological deposit to be considered part of the patent disclosure. Initially,
once a deposit is made with an IDA the applicant must advise the commissioner of patents of the
name of the depositary and the date of the deposit. A single deposit with an IDA may be
referenced in multiple national patent filings. To ensure that a deposit is readily available to the
public, a depositer is required to make a biological sample available for a period of at least 30
years from the date of deposit, and for at least five years as of the date of the most recent request
to the IDA to provide a sample of the materials.83
Another disclosure requirement that must be complied with by biological inventions, such as
PDVs, involve sequence listings. Specifically, patent applications disclosing a nucleotide or
amino acid sequence that has not been previously disclosed are required to provide a sequence
listing in their content. Compliant sequence listings must include the actual sequence as well as
associated information in accordance with the format set out in the Patent Rules.
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80 Supra note 13 at s. 38.1.
81 MOPOP, supra note 42 at 17.03.
82 MOPOP, supra note 42 at 17.04.
83 Regulations under the Budapest Treaty. WIPO, adopted on April 28, 1977 and amended on January 20,
1981 and October 1, 2002, rules 6 and 9.
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3. PDVs and biotechnology
The aforementioned patent requirements specific to biotechnology inventions are significant for
PDVs. Most alarming is the recognition that whether a PDV patent extends rights to the plant
element is unclear. Moreover, listing and biological material deposit requirements pose a risk of
deficient disclosure that is unique to biotechnology inventions. Applicants for PDV patents
should be aware of the hurdles facing the attainment of IP protection for this category of
invention.
D. A developing nation product
Several characteristics of PDVs cause them to have particular benefits for developing nations.
For example, vaccine materials may be propagated quickly, in large quantities, at a low cost, and
may be easily transported even to remote areas. These qualities suggest that issues such as access
and affordability, which hinder the application of many existing medicines in developing nation
environments, may be overcome by PDVs. Nonetheless, the fact that PDVs are expressly
intended to be applied in developing nations raises notable considerations for IP protection
strategies. For instance, the fact that views on IP protection differ between developing and
developing countries is of import as the balance of intellectual protection for PDVs can become
very difficult to attain because PDVs play a role in both worlds.84 PDV innovations are owned by
developed world researchers, but may ultimately be applied primarily in developing nation
environments.
There is a concern that strong IP rights, and patent rights in particular, may negatively affect the
accessibility of vaccine technologies in developing nations because they foster the
monopolization of marketplace sectors, and in turn inflate prices.85 Although patent rights are not
the only barrier to access to medicines in developing nations – infrastructure and investment also
play a role – rights-holders’ activities can exacerbate the problem.86 In the words of one
commentator, support for innovation should be put into perspective as it is, “a leap of faith for
investors in industrialized countries; imagine how hard it is in countries where R&D
expenditures may be only a fraction…of gross national product, skilled and educated labor is at
a premium, intellectual turf wars stifle collaboration, economic difficulties and inflation are
rampant, venture capital investors are an unknown species, intellectual property protection is
murky and political turmoil is a frequent backdrop.”87 Although an exact price tag has not been
attached to the cost of bringing a new vaccine into the public sector in developing countries, it is
estimated that in the case of a hepatitis B vaccine, “from first licensure in a developed country, it
can take an additional 10-15 years or more and substantial financial resources to introduce such
a vaccine into significant numbers of developing country national immunization programs.”88
This means committed funding over a long period is required. Many commentators agree that
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intellectual property rights than developing nations. Strong IP rights allow a holder to wield substantial power over
the access and price of an innovation. This can be detrimental for developing nations, creating barriers for access to
innovation.
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patent rights must be part of the solution,89 what is unclear is the strength of the patent rights that
must be granted
Many partnerships90 and major global funds91 have been formed to work on the issues relating to
vaccine implementation in developing nations. Simultaneous with these developing nation
programs, developed nation efforts on vaccine production have taken on greater significance in
light of concerns about the potential for pandemics.92 Although no clear solutions have emerged
as of yet regarding how to most effectively apply vaccines internationally, the issue of IP rights
is of primary concern in the context of the debate. This is particularly true in developing nations
that are plagued with preventable diseases. Two elements which may greatly influence any
solution regarding the force of IP rights over vaccine products, such as PDVs, are the TRIPs
provisions for least-developed countries (“LDCs”) and the open source patent initiative.
1. TRIPs & LDCs
Article 66 of TRIPs directly addresses IP rights to be applied in LDCs. Specifically the article
exempts LDCs from compliance with most of the provisions of TRIPs due to “their economic,
financial and administrative constraints, and their need for flexibility to create a viable
technological base.”93 This is not an exemption for all time, but for a term of ten years from the
date when the state becomes a member country, with the possibility of a further extension period
upon request.94 Hand-in-hand with the LDC exemption in TRIPs is an admonition to developed
nations to create incentives for corporations within their borders to engage in technology
transfers to LDCs, “in order to enable [LDCs] to create a sound and viable technological
base.”95
Thus, the effect of article 66 is that LDCs are granted a reprieve from implementing national IP
regimes for a time. This is both good and bad for LDCs. Because a LDC does not have to grant
IP protection copying of inventions is permissible and market monopolies may be averted.
However, one of the reasons why LDCs have been granted an exception from TRIPs is because
they lack the financial and scientific infrastructure to produce and support innovation internally.
Therefore, LDCs need to import innovations from other countries.96 As has been previously
                                                 
89 See, Carlos Morel, et al., “Health Innovation in Developing Countries to Address Diseases of the Poor”,
Innovation Strategy Today, n°1, 2005, p. 1 at 3; Supra note 17 at 787; and Supra note 3 at 29.
90 Such as the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative, the International Partnership for Microbicides, the
Medicines for Malaria Venture, Malaria Vaccine Initiative, and the Global Alliance for TB Drug Development. See,
Morel, supra note 89 at 3.
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Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Marlaria. See Ibid.
92 See, David S. Fedson, “Preparing for Pandemic Vaccination: An International Policy Agenda for Vaccine
Development”, Journal of Public Health Policy, n°26, 2005, p. 4, and Chris L. Barrett, et al., “If Smallpox Strikes
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(at 4).
93 See, article 66(1) of TRIPs.
94 WTO members have since decided to extend the ten-year period to at least 2016 for pharmaceutical
products. See “TRIPS Council Agreements on Extension for LDCs on Pharmaceutical Patents”, Bridges, vol. 6,
n°25, 3 July 2002, <http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/02-07-03/story1.htm>.
95 TRIPs, article 66(2).
96 See, supra note 12 at 647.
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mentioned, it can be difficult to attract national investment if the LDC cannot offer market
returns, which are normally gleaned due to market monopoly made possible by exclusive patent
rights. The result is a vicious-circle. LDCs are not required to have patent regimes in place
because they do not create innovation due to the fact that they lack the infrastructure –
laboratories, trained scientific staff, sophisticated equipment, etc. – to do so.97 Consequently,
LDCs fail to attract the investment necessary to build an internal infrastructure because they do
not offer the benefits of national patent rights to investors.98 The cycle is self-perpetuating.
So on the one hand national patent rights cannot a hinder access to drugs in LDCs because they
do not exist, but on the other hand the lack of patent rights may pose a barrier to access to drugs
in LDCs since the drugs must be imported from developed nations where patent rights are
offered. The imported drugs are likely sold at a premium price as a result of the patent rights.
Moreover, since pharmaceutical companies cannot attain patent rights for their products and
processes in LDCs there is a lack of interest in facilitating the production of drugs within LDCs.
Copying of drugs may be permissible in LDCs, but at the same time it is impossible for LDCs to
undertake an initiative to copy a drug due to a lack of sophisticated infrastructure.99 In sum,
despite the TRIPs exception, patent rights are not meaningless for LDCs.
2. Open source patents
In order to surmount the hurdle that patent rights pose to the development and accessibility of
vaccines and other drugs, and in light of the serious threat of tropical diseases100 and preventable
diseases,101 new forms of IP rights are evolving. One such alternate right is referred to as open
source patents. Basically open source means that rights in an innovation will not be wielded to
produce a marketplace monopoly for a holder. The purpose of open source in some
biotechnology projects is to “counteract the phenomenon in certain research areas in which
progress is hampered by the rights structure surrounding basic investigative tools.”102 Another
benefit of open source is to provide ease of access to final product inventions. When viewed in a
more idyllic light, open source may be seen as an attempt to return to earlier perceptions of
scientific R&D, which viewed scientific innovation as belonging to the scientific community as a
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99 It is worth observing that TRIPs has initiated problems for non-LDC countries as well. In order to comply
with TRIPs India, a developing nation but not an LDC, was required to expand their patent laws to include
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whole, and endorsed freely-available information.103 As there are multiple modes of achieving
these goals open source is not a single form of right, but rather a category encompassing various
means all having a common purpose.
The open source concept originated in the realm of copyright where the IP right is granted
immediately without any formal application or registration process.104 Due to the fact that there
must necessarily be a right granted for copyright, open source in that realm functions as a type of
license agreement. Specifically, open source copyright involves non-exclusive license
agreements which provide free access to protected materials. Drawing from the copyright
experience some open source patent initiatives build a free-flow of information upon the
foundation of a granted patent right.105
The Public Patent Foundation (“PPF”) is an open source project which facilitates the creation of
a commons wherein patents may be pooled and made freely available to other participants.106 In
basic terms PPF grants a non-exclusive and payment-free license to all participants. The
Biological Innovation for Open Society (“BIOS”) also collects patented technologies, although
its undertaking is more focused upon research tools than final products. BIOS’ goal is to
“assemble groups of enabling technologies that together provide the pieces necessary for a
particular form of research investigation.”107 The BIOS approach recognizes that the
monopolization of research tools can be just as detrimental to innovation as exclusive rights over
a final product. PPF and BIOS both require participants to execute a license agreement, however
the terms of the agreement created by each group will likely differ.108
Still another approach is taken by the Tropical Disease Initiative (“TDI”), which does not seek
patent rights at all.109 TDI is focused upon creating a website providing database access to a
collection of information, such as “searching for new targets, finding chemicals to attack known
targets, and posting data from related chemistry and biological experiments.”110 An added
benefit of TDI’s format is that the information is easily accessible by researchers in developing
nations. TDI believes that their form of open source will aid virtual pharmas in particular –
                                                 
103 David W. Opderbeck, “The Penguin’s Genome, or Coase and Open Source Biotechnology”, Harv. J. Law
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104 Feldman, at 117. See, ibid. Opderbeck tries to draw a clear relation between software open source and
biotechnology opens source by analogizing the layers of software machine and program code to the layers of DNA.
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106 Supra note 102 at 126.
107 Ibid.
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“grant back any improvements in the core technology and to make such improvements freely available to all others
on the same terms that BIOS provided for the original technology.”
109 Supra note 100 at 171.
110 Ibid.
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organizations that are not engaged in in-house development, but utilize a grouping of commercial
and academic partnerships to create a portfolio of promising drug innovations.111
No matter what format is enforced, open source is an alternative to traditional patent monopolies.
It is a grassroots initiative based upon a cry from the people – researchers, scientists, students
and developing nation advocates – who recognize that patent rights may no longer act to promote
innovation, but instead may hinder it. The plea for change is evidence that “an open source
community must develop from the bottom up; it cannot be imposed from the top down.”112
3. PDVs and developing nation products
The aforementioned points highlight that the developing nation product element of PDVs may
cause owners to wield their patent rights in a weak manner, or to forego IP protection altogether.
LDC exemptions mean IP rights are not available in some areas where PDVs may be applied.
Moreover, some inventors may endorse open source patent initiatives and reject the exclusive
nature of patent rights. As such contractual agreements may carry the bulk of the burden for the
protection of PDVs. Such agreements could even dictate the scope of an inventor’s ability to
engage in consultation and co-ordination with organizations capable of implementing a vaccine
initiatives where the vaccine products are most needed.113 These agreements will be a key factor
for the emergence of PDVs in the marketplace. No matter what IP protection options an inventor
considers, concerns regarding access to PDVs in developing nations, where they have the
potential to significantly reduce fatal disease, should remain foremost. These concerns should be
an integral aspect of the IP protection strategy applied to PDVs.
Part III – PDVs as a new category of technology
Now that the varied nature of PDVs has been outlined, along with the many categories of
technology that pertain to attributes of PDVs, as well as the issues relevant to each category, we
have the necessary tools to engage in a discussion about the category of IP protection for PDVs.
More importantly we can address who should undertake the required analysis. Presently, it is the
inventor who decides the type of protection to be sought. Of course, the inventor may seek the
advice of a patent agent, or other legal professional, but ultimately the final judgment rests solely
in the inventor’s hands. It is not clear that this is the best means of ensuring that an appropriate
IP protection scheme is achieved.
As the average inventor is unlikely to be an IP expert, it is conceivable that decisions regarding
protection for a new category of invention, such as PDVs, do not routinely involve a weighing of
all of the relevant issues surrounding innovation protection. Moreover, it is probable that
subsidiary considerations, such as economic gain, may be given undue weight and ultimately
cloud the decision. It is understandable that concerns regarding economic return should be given
import, considering the high cost of developing and testing a new vaccine product. Any inventor
of a PDV would of course be interested in reaping as much of a financial benefit from his or her
invention as possible. However, as we have discussed, there are many aspects of IP protection
which are not influenced by economic factors which can widen or narrow the scope of the right
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that is granted. Whether too much or too little protection is achieved is really a value
judgement,114 but a carefully crafted protection strategy will diminish the risk that the protection
will not match the technology.
Another danger of leaving complete control over the solicitation of IP rights in the hands of the
inventor is that once a mode of protection has been launched for a first technology in a category
of new innovation, it is likely that subsequent inventors will follow suit. The result is that the
pioneer strategy becomes the norm for the category of invention. This is because subsequent
inventors want equal shares of the market-pie and therefore need to claim commensurate
protection for their inventions. As such, the decisions made by the initial inventor will have a
great impact and may set the standard for the technology category as a whole. The standard in
turn will affect other means of protecting an innovation, such as contracts and licenses, all of
which derive their power from the scope of the granted IP rights.115 The unfortunate truth is that,
whether the protection decisions were soundly made, or based upon clouded judgment or faulty
information, the initial inventor’s choices will have a wide effect.
Drafting patent claims is one aspect of an IP protection strategy that may be particularly
troublesome for new categories of technology. The claims of a patent set-out the scope of the
rights which are granted to the holder. The SCC has stated in several recent cases that patent
rights are intended to be balanced with the interests of the public,116 and has commented that
public interests may be adversely affected by “cluttering the public domain with useless
patents.”117 Useless patents may be those that are poorly drafted or those that disclose frivolous
inventions. Thus, the mode of claiming an invention should be well thought-out. This is
especially true for new technologies, such as PDVs, which cover several traditional categories of
patentable subject matter. Patent claims are to be drafted so that the public “will be able to know
not only where it must not trespass but also where it may safely go.”118 In other words the claims
should clearly define the scope of the patent rights.119 Unfortunately it is rare to find a set of
clearly drafted claims, as “patent drafters seem congenitally unable to employ plain
language.”120 Of course the complexity of the invention will affect the complexity of the claims,
but the clarity of patent claims is not assisted by the fact that patent agents attempt to push the
boundaries of patent scope to be as wide as possible and sometimes employ expansive language
to further this pursuit.121 For PDVs, a patent protection strategy will not be aided by claims that
ignore the issues of the categories linked to the various characteristics of the innovation. Each
attribute is directly related to the means by which rights over PDVs must be divided between
society and the inventor, and consequently to the achievment of balance.
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An ill-considered protection strategy not only sets a bad precedent, but it is difficult to reverse
without wreaking havoc. Once a mode of protecting an innovation is adopted generally for a
category of technology the only means of thwarting its application is to challenge the protection.
For example, a patent that is challenged all the way to litigation will cause a court to determine
issues of validity or infringement of patent rights. The trouble is that by the time a court hears a
patent challenge many years have passed since the application for the invention was first filed.
At this point the strategy of protection is likely deeply entrenched. Any court decision which
denounces any aspect of the strategy has the potential to affect many other innovations along
with the one at bar. More concisely, an early poor strategy put in place by an inventor may not be
recognized as problematic until a much later date, at which point the commentary may adversely
affect a large number of inventions within a category of technology.
The decision in Kirin Amgen v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd.122 exemplifies the potential breadth
of effect that a court decision can have upon patent rights over a biotechnology invention. In
Kirin Amgen the House of Lords construed claims over a gene and accepted the finding of the
English Court of Appeals that held, “to seek to monopolise use of the sequence when not isolated
by inserting a construct into a human cell would provide a monopoly not properly supported by
the description in the specification.”123 The House of Lords limited the viable patent monopoly
solely to isolated genes. Kirin Amgen stands as a precedent decision which affects the
construction of claims in other patents which were drafted in a like manner, and causes the patent
scope of those other patents to be similarly limited. As such, a decision such as Kirin Amgen, has
the potential to “change research priorities and force firms to (re)consider their research and
commercialization priorities.”124 Post-Kirin future patent applicants will likely alter their claims
as a result of the decision. Thus, Kirin also exemplifies how changing a protection strategy
partway through the emergence of a technology can create a gap between protection granted to
technologies within the same category according to the date when protection is sought.
Furthermore, confusion about adequate IP protection may be caused by the availability of
multiple forms of IP regimes to protect a single category of technology. An example of this
situation is evident in the software sector. Software inventions are protectable both by the
copyright and patent regimes. The relationship between these two forms of protection was
unclear when software was first gaining a foothold in the marketplace. Since time is of the
essence for patenting, due to the first-to-file rule, it is not surprising that early in the emergence
of software no one took the time to complete a comprehensive analysis of the relationship
between the regimes and to determine how to achieve the optimum IP protection for software
innovations. The result is that this area of IP protection is still a bone of contention for some and
a source of confusion amongst scholars and industry.125
Achieving tailored IP protection is of the utmost importance to PDVs and should be addressed
now while they are still an emerging category of technology. PDVs bring together many
elements into a single invention and, like software, are therefore rife with confusion. Even the
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form of patent applications that should be filed for PDVs is an important issue, as the choice can
have a variety of implications depending on which aspects of the innovation are disclosed.
Moreover, there may be additional filing steps that relate to some elements of PDVs. As has been
discussed, biotechnology applications may require supplemental filings, such as nucleotide
sequence lists, or biological material deposits to be considered complete; whereas the drug
element of PDVs may require NOC listings to truly be effective in the marketplace. It is an
unavoidable fact that much information and many issues must be weighed to determine the IP
rights to be granted to PDVs. All forms of protection available to PDVs as well as the issues
raised by each relevant to the category of technology must be assessed in order for
comprehensive IP protection to be achieved.
Due to the fact that an attempt to change a protection strategy for a category of innovation after it
is entrenched can be very difficult, analysis should take place as early as possible. Waiting for
the courts to point out mistakes many years down the road is too late to for effective change to
occur. In fact, such an initiative may be likened to trying to patch a dam while water is running
over it – a task that will never be perfectly achieved. In light of this fact, it seems obvious that
continuing to allow pioneer inventors to devise a protection strategy for a new category of
technology is inadvisable. Inventors do not necessarily collect all of the relevant information
before implementing a strategy. Now is the time to develop another approach.
Part IV – proposed approach for IP protection for new technologies
It is a well-established principle that IP protection must be supported by effective regulation and
that such regulation must be derived as a result of well-informed and thoughtful analysis.126 In
light of this accepted tenet we must ask; should there not also be a concentrated effort to study
the best IP protection for new technologies as they emerge? Recognizing that the inventor does
not necessarily have the expertise or information to fully analyze all of the issues relevant to IP
protection for a new category of technology, it seems to make sense that someone else take on
this role.
An upfront approach to planning IP protection strategies for new technology categories may
avoid the exploitation of a invention and undue monopolization of a market sector, a present
plague occurring internationally.127 A proactive approach may also reverse the lag in legislative
response to scientific change, which currently creates gaps in protection.128 The act of merely
“gap-filling” has been noted as dangerous because this type of action does not promote a
coherent scheme and may even “choke the very innovation it was meant to nourish.”129 Clearly
addressing IP protection early is key.
The foregoing leads us to the conclusion that questions of how to instigate the analysis and who
should undertake it are critical. Looking at the situation in practical terms, it would seem that
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analysis may be best instigated at the patent office level. Nowadays, it can be assumed that most
inventors seek patents, due to the potential economic incentives offered by that form of
protection. Thus, the patent office is a logical place to set-up a means of identifying new
categories of technology. Identification could be easily undertaken if upon the receipt of a patent
application that discloses a new category of innovation, one which has never been dealt with
previously, the patent office flags the application.130 The act of flagging an application would
then be followed by a meeting of a review panel, having members representing expertise in the
traditional categories of innovation which are covered by the patent application – e.g., for PDVs
biotechnology, plants, drugs, developing nation products – as well as IP law.131 The panel would
then review the innovation and analyze the IP protection options which are open to the new
category of technology it represents. Ultimately the panel would create a set of guidelines which
would set-out how innovators in the field should protect their inventions. The guidelines would
address a best method of protection, considerations relating to protection of specific aspects the
new technology, as well as the relationship between forms of protection and elements of the
technology. The guidelines would not necessarily be binding upon innovators but would
primarily provide an educational tool. Inventors would thereby be provided with information
they may not have been privy to otherwise about relevant issues that should influence the
development and application of IP protection strategies.
Obviously an immediate, first-response objection to this proposal is that invoking an expert panel
and the process of analysis is time-consuming. However, as it takes several months before a
patent application reaches the examination stage, the option of convening a panel prior to
commencing patent prosecution should not be too onerous. To aid in this endeavour a list of
qualified persons would be kept in the patent office and panel members would be chosen
therefrom, according to the expertise required to address a category of invention. Moreover,
applications for other inventions fitting within the new category would be subsequently flagged
and none would be examined prior to the creation of the guidelines. All applicants will thereby
be kept on an even playing field.
Deliberations of the panel will be related to the new category of invention, rather than a specific
invention disclosed in a flagged patent application. The flagging of a patent application upon
receipt is merely a means of triggering a panel. A second method of instigating a panel review
may be applied as well. Inventors who realize that they will likely be interested in filing a patent
application for a new category of innovation in the near future, could provide the patent office
with the relevant details about the technology and request that a panel be convened prior to the
filing of the patent application. In the implementation of either option, the goal is early detection.
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For the purposes of this paper, the most important aspect of this proposal is that it is a proactive
solution. One which attempts to address issues relevant to new categories of technology in an
enlightened manner before other less-considered means of protecting those innovations and of
thinking about those innovations become entrenched. To formulate guidelines, experts will sit
down together and address the nature of a new technology before problematic practices become
the standard. The effectiveness and importance of panel deliberations has been cited in the
context of other technology policy initiatives.132 As complex inventions, such as PDVs, do not fit
existing IP protection moulds, they therefore require concentrated analysis to achieve a
comprehensive approach recognizing the unique aspects of their nature. Moreover, reviewing a
new technology in the early stages of its emergence is crucial because it ensures that the law of
IP protection is “(re)connected to mainstream principles about technology.”133 In sum, a
proactive approach does not only facilitate appropriate IP protection, it also aids the continuation
of a balanced and cohesive IP approach in Canada.
Conclusion
PDVs are hailed as a new category of technology which promises to effectively combat disease
worldwide through the provision of a cost-effective and easy to administer vaccination product.
Whether PDVs actually fulfill their promise will be determined to some extent by the IP
protection strategy that is applied to this class of technology. Due to their varied nature PDVs
will be forced to cut their own protection path and will be unable to fit entirely within any
existing category of technology. IP protection for PDVs must recognize the established
technology categories relevant to PDVs – plants, drugs, biotechnologies and developing nation
products – as experiences gleaned from each of these categories are instructive to PDV
protection deliberations. However, as PDVs combine these categories in a single product,
consequently forming a new category of technology, PDVs will have to forge their own way to
achieve appropriate IP protection.
As we may consider ourselves to be forewarned that PDVs will raise unique issues and require a
distinct protection strategy, it seems obvious that action should be taken to determine the best
method of IP protection for PDVs as soon as possible. Establishing guidelines early will avert
gaps in protection down the road, which may occur should it be left to inventors to create a
strategy and courts to modify it after it is entrenched. A further aspect of proactive PDV analysis
which should be implemented to formulate protection guidelines is expert opinion. The strategy
of giving inventors full-rein over the establishment of protection strategies poses the risk that the
resulting solutions may be clouded by superfluous concerns, or a lack of information. The fallout
from subjecting PDVs to inappropriate protection could be problematic on a number of levels,
due to the complexity of the technology. The protection of a  technology with so much potential
should not be left to chance or in inexpert hands. PDVs exemplify a category of technology that,
not only would benefit from, but basically cries out for, a comprehensive, informed, tailored
approach to the implementation of an IP protection strategy. PDVs are an emerging innovation
and a new category of technology, the time to act is now.
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